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I 
INTRODUCTION
It is a common scholarly lament that definitional imprecision leads to 
theoretical confusion. Such a lament seems well placed in institutional history, 
where two key terms—institutions and organizations—are used by many
historians as essentially synonymous. Meanwhile, new institutional economists 
who delve deeply into economic history see the concepts as terms of art: 
institutions are the “rules of the game” or “equilibria” whereas organizations are
agents that seek to optimize scarce resources and otherwise operate within the
constraints created by these institutions. 
In this Article, I argue that a new institutional synthesis in history, legal 
scholarship, and economics represents a challenge to both definitional 
approaches. It also represents an opportunity to define a new, intellectually 
energizing path ahead of legal scholarship on institutions. Without doing so 
explicitly, a new generation of legal scholars have profitably explored institutions 
as both organizations and rules, neither too closely wedded with a single 
organizational entity nor lost in the long and slow change of the rules over 
millennia. These scholars have begun to see how formal and informal rules that 
govern politics, society, and the economy change through organizations in both
short bursts and over long horizons. The key insight is that the new institutional
synthesis can build a theoretically robust methodology that is flexible enough to
be deployed in a wide array of disciplines, including law, history, economics,
sociology, and beyond.
In the 1970s and 1980s, law and economics shot up like a rocket as perhaps 
the most dominant intellectual movement in law. At the same time many law and 
economics scholars were intent on bringing the discipline of economics to the 
study of law:1 ironically, economists were importing the discipline of law into the 
Copyright © 2020 by Peter Conti-Brown. 
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Assistant Professor at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and Nonresident Fellow 
in Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution. 
1. For one of the first near contemporaneous assessments of the law and economics movement, 
see generally Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 12 (1987)
(“[W]hat may loosely be called the economic theory of law has a significant potential to alter received 
notions, generate testable hypotheses about a variety of important social phenomena, and in short 
enlarge our knowledge of the world.”). For a more recent historical assessment, see generally STEVEN
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158 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:157
study of economics. In what came to be known variously by distinct, if 
overlapping, names like “new institutionalism,” “new institutional economics,”
or less often “new institutional history,” economists and like-minded historians 
began to apply the methodologies of theoretical and empirical economics to 
historical questions. These historical applications helped economists and
historians understand how institutions in society arose over time.2 
Two additional disciplinary approaches to the study of institutions took place
in the 1980s–2000s in history and sociology. These approaches only paid passing
attention to new institutional economics and virtually did not engage with law 
and economics. First, the historian Louis Galambos, in three influential essays in
the Business History Review, defined and redefined (and redefined) an
organizational synthesis whereby political historians started to ask and answer 
harder questions about the development of the firm, the state, and its various 
constituent actors.3 Second, sociologists and organizational theorists developed 
an approach to historical institutionalism that provides a useful if incomplete
jumping-off point for the study of institutional history.4 
These four movements—legal academics’ law and economics, economists’ 
new institutional economics, historians’ organizational synthesis, and the 
sociologists’ historical institutionalism—arose together in time, but not together 
in space. The larger institutional economics revolution paid essentially no 
attention to the sociologists, the sociologists paid some bitter attention to the 
economists (for “discovering” what they had long been discussing), and most 
everyone ignored the historians, who in turn mostly spoke to each other. Law and 
MICHAEL TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL 
OF THE LAW 90–101 (2010) (describing founding law and economics leaders’ desire to prove “economic 
reasoning could apply to the entire legal system”). 
2. For an overview of the depth and diversity of new institutional economics (NIE), see CLAUDE
MENARD & MARY M. SHIRLEY, HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1–2 (2008) (“NIE 
focuses on how . . . institutions emerge, operate, and evolve, and how they shape the different 
arrangements that support production and exchange, as well as how these arrangements act in turn to
change the rules of the game.”). 
3. For an overview of Galambos’ ongoing definition of organizational synthesis, see Louis 
Galambos, The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History, 44 BUS. HIST. REV. 
279, 285 (1970) (“It seems likely that large-scale organizations have influenced all of these institutions, 
and could perhaps provide social history with a new type of centralizing theme.”) [hereinafter Emerging
Organizational Synthesis]; Louis Galambos, Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization:
Central Themes of the Organizational Synthesis, 57 BUS. HIST. REV. 471, 491–92 (1983) (elaborating on
“organizational synthesis” in response to more developed scholarship in the field); Louis Galambos, 
Recasting the Organizational Synthesis: Structure and Process in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 
79 BUS. HIST. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“Globalization and the third industrial revolution. . . are changing the
structure and processes of major U.S. institutions and are thus modifying our understanding both of the 
last century and of the recent past.”) [hereinafter Recasting the Organizational Synthesis].
 4. See, e.g., Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti & Adam Sheingate, Historical Institutionalism in
Political Science, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 1 (Orfeo Fioretos,
Tulia G. Falleti, & Adam Sheingate eds., 2016) (“In comparative politics, historical institutionalism has 
been particularly influential and shapes research agendas in a widening array of substantive areas, from 
research on the modern state, capitalism, law, and economic development to the study of political 
regimes, political parties, organized societal actors, and public policy.”). 
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economics was also, with the important arguable exception of Ronald Coase, on
its own trajectory. 
The failure of engagement among these scholarly camps is largely 
epiphenomenal. These disciplines are separate because they are motivated by 
different kinds of questions, however close in intellectual proximity they may 
appear. New institutional economists were unapologetically interested in the full 
breadth of human history extending millennia to understand deep truths about
economics. Theirs was an assault on the existing order in economics. Sociologists 
were interested in institutions as primarily social phenomena. Organizational 
historians, for their part, were originally just trying to reinterpret the Progressive 
Era in the United States.
In this Article, I chart the path of new institutional economics against two 
other trends in history and sociology to propose a new way to approach legal 
scholarship: new institutional synthesis. This approach allows scholars to take 
institutions seriously, use the comparative advantages of law as an academic 
discipline, and engage more completely with scholars in other fields who remain
curious about law but without a path toward more effective engagement. I argue 
that a new institutional synthesis in history, legal scholarship, and economics 
represents a challenge to definitional approaches to institutions and
organizations. New institutional synthesis also represents an opportunity to
define a new, intellectually-energizing path for legal scholarship on institutions. 
When we place the intellectual historical currents of legal scholarship, new 
institutional economics, history, and sociology in conversation with each other,
we see something new. In Part II of this Article, I chart the three trends in the 
study of institutions—(A) new institutional economics, (B) the organizational 
synthesis in history, and (C) historical institutionalism in sociology—along with
(D) law and economics, to argue that there is a possibility of bridging these gaps
through a new institutional synthesis. I then show in Part III how a rising
generation of legal scholars and historians have been part of a new institutional 
synthesis: they have profitably explored institutions as both organizations and
rules, neither too closely wedded with a single organizational entity nor lost in
the long and slow change of the rules over millennia. These scholars have begun 
to see how formal and informal rules that govern politics, society, and the 
economy change through organizations in both short bursts and over long
horizons. This theoretically-robust methodology presents a fertile and active 
space for thinking about corporations, the financial system, and the economy. 
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II
ACADEMIC APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS
A. New Institutional Economics 
1. Institutions in Economics, Old and New 
“Institutions” in economic thought enjoy a storied history and were, arguably, 
there at the beginning. Adam Smith was, after all, consumed with thinking 
through the limitations to a mercantilist system, and had plenty to say about
institutional features such as banks.5 But as the Ricardian revolution took hold,
the effort was to reason deductively in search of universal truths about human
behavior.6 Marshall and Mill sought to combine both approaches, making 
economic policy both deductive and sensitive to its historical and policy contexts.7 
This was the initial fight: institutionalists, such as they were, wanted economics 
to be more than abstract formulations of profit maximization. To be an 
institutionalist meant to be mindful of history, context, and society. 
Two schools of institutional thought arose in reaction to Ricardian economics 
(often called “classical economics”), one as a consequence of the other. The first 
school was the German historical school of economics. German historicism was 
active from the 1840s into the early twentieth century and was notable both for 
Max Weber, as its most famous proponent, and Gustav Schmoller, as its major 
founder.8 These scholars’ critiques focused less on the meaning of institutions and 
more on the idea that economics as an abstraction failed to accurately describe
the way people made decisions.9 Institutions, in that broad sense, essentially 
meant historical context.
The second school was American institutional economics. As the school took
root in the first half of the twentieth century, German historicism profoundly 
affected American institutional economics through its educational dominance— 
graduate training for academics was heavily oriented toward the German model 
and to German universities into the early twentieth century. The term
“institutional economics” was first used by Walton Hamilton at a meeting of the 
5. See 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 417–44 (1776) (discussing the shortcomings of 
the mercantilist system).
6. For a good recent overview of institutions in early economic thought, see generally BEÁTA 
FARKAS, MODELS OF CAPITALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: POST CRISIS PERSPECTIVES 3–6 (2016) 
(providing a “brief historical overview” of institutions in mainstream economics). 
7. See  ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS xix–xx (1890) (casting doubt on the
wisdom of a rational economic actor and arguing that economics must take into account “ethical forces” 
when studying behavior); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY v (1848) 
(describing author’s intent to “exhibit the economical phenomena of society in the relation in which they 
stand to the best social of ideas of the present time”). 
8. For an overview of the German historical school of economics, see generally Keith Tribe, 
Historical Schools of Economics: German and English 5–14 (Keele Econ. Research Papers, July 15, 2002) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=316689 [https://perma.cc/49W9-3NN8]. 
9. Id.
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 161 No. 1 2020] INSTITUTIONS
newly-formed American Economic Association in 1918.10 Again, as with 
Marshall,11 “institutions” meant only the broader historical context that served to 
reorient individual efforts to economize.12 The early institutionalists did not 
engage very carefully in a definitional game. Weber was slightly more specific, 
thinking through the implications of “institutions” like bureaucracy and culture, 
but the term evaded easy definition.13 
The wave of classical deductive abstractionism and historical 
contextualization continued through the late twentieth century until the new 
institutionalists sought to combine the approaches and, in the process, give the 
term more analytical content. “Institutions” for the new institutional 
economists—led by pioneers like Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, and later 
Avner Greif, among many others—meant something very specific. In North’s 
words, institutions were the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction,” comprised of “both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights).”14 Greif later pushed back against this 
conception, thinking of institutions instead as “equilibria,” more or less stable
patterns of useful human behavior.15 But the idea is the same: institutions are the 
rules of the road, not the organizations that operate within those rules. 
Given the success of institutional economics within mainstream economics— 
it is responsible for at least five Nobel Prizes, depending on how one is 
counting16—it is perhaps easy to forget how radical new institutional economics 
was at its inception in the 1970s. Institutions were controversial because these
kinds of patterns of behavior were not supposed to matter in economic 
development. Markets carried their own logic, and agents should have found 
their best expression through these markets. According to classical economics,
institutions (if they exist at all) were either implications of, or interferences with,
market liberalism. 
10. Malcom Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 3, Summer
2001, at 173, 178–79. 
11. See generally MARSHALL, supra note 7. 
12. See id. at 1789–82 (outlining the many topics taken on by new institutional economists relating 
institutions and policy to economic performance). 
13. See  MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 65 (1949) (“The indirect
influence of social relations, institutions and groups governed by ‘material interests’ extends (often
unconsciously) into all spheres of culture without exception, even into the finest nuances of aesthetic and
religious feeling.”).
14.  Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP., no, 1, Winter 1991, at 97, 97. 
15. AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM
MEDIEVAL TRADE 19–20 (2006). 
16. They are: Coase (1991), Fogel (1993), North (1993), Ostrom (2009), and Williamson (2009). 
Despite their discussions of institutions, I’m not counting the 1974 prizes to Hayek and Myrdal. All Prizes
in Economic Sciences, THE NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/lists/all-prizes-in-
economic-sciences/ [https://perma.cc/P75Y-R38V]. For more, see also AVNER OFFER & GABRIEL 
SODERBERG, THE NOBEL FACTOR: THE PRIZE IN ECONOMICS, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, AND THE 
MARKET TURN 123 (2016) (discussing the “strong performances of institutional economists” for the 
Nobel Prize). 
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162 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:157
The institutionalists’ idea, led by Douglass North, was that institutions were 
not simply the reflexive expression of, or interference with, market clearing. 
Rather, institutions showed why equilibria fail, why choices can be idiosyncratic, 
preferences unstable, maximization incomplete, and optimization sometimes 
complex.17 Institutions, in North’s view, additionally were not merely theoretical 
propositions, but intimately connected with history.18 In one of his most 
important articles, for example, North (with Barry Weingast) confronted the 
puzzle of how Britain could transform from an unstable economy where investors 
could only participate in financing the sovereign through force to one of the most 
economically-developed models of the state in history.19 More specifically, they 
asked why investors came to trust British institutions—the rules of the game— 
when (1) the sovereign with a monopoly on violence was involved in the game 
and (2) the sovereign made up the rules himself.20 In other words, how can the 
sovereign who seeks voluntary participation from others credibly commit to 
playing by the same rules as everyone else?21 
North and Weingast argued that the structural changes wrought as part of the 
Glorious Revolution—in particular, the assignment of governmental powers to
an independent judiciary, a sovereign Parliament that is separate from the
sovereign King—were evidence of this kind of institutional change.22 For 
evidence of the value proposition for institutional change to assist with market 
functions, they also cited the dramatic success the Crown had in raising funds 
through the capital markets following the Glorious Revolution, an increase by an 
order of magnitude.23 
These changes are interesting for history, but also “provide[] an endogenous 
role for political institutions. Restrictions on the ex post behavior of the state
improve the state’s ability to maintain its part of bargains with constituents, for 
example, not to expropriate their wealth.”24 The innovation of the Glorious 
Revolution was to use rules that would make this commitment credible. These
new rules included parliamentary supremacy, especially in fiscal and financial 
matters, an independent judiciary, and the securing of political rights for citizens,
17. Id. at 20. 
18. See id. at vii (“History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but
because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions.”).
 19. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 828 (1989) 
(describing “the successful evolution of institutional forms that permitted economic growth to take place 
in early modern England”). 
20. See id. at 829–30 (describing the impact institutions had on British capital markets). 
21. See id. at 806 (“Because the state has a comparative advantage in coercion, what prevents it from
using violence to extract all the surplus?”). 
22. See id. at 819 (“By limiting the ability of the government to renege on its agreements, the courts 
played a central role in assuring a commitment to secure rights.”). 
23. See id. at 824 (“Even though the later Stuarts were more financially successful than their
predecessors, nothing that came before the Glorious Revolution suggests the dramatic change in capital 
markets that it unleashed.”). 
24. Id. at 808 (emphasis added). 
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 163 No. 1 2020] INSTITUTIONS
especially property holders. The Constitution is the thing: it places the authority
to contract for obligations in one set of hands, but the authority to withdraw from
them in another. 
Northian definitional conceptions of institutions were not the only order of 
the day. Writing at the same time but focusing his definitional effort a little later,
economist Oliver Williamson laid out the contribution more schematically. His 
famous view of institutionalism is reproduced in Figure 1.25 
Figure 1: Economics of Institutions 
Level Frequency Purpose  
(years) 
Embeddedness: informal Often noncalculative: 
institutions, customs, 10
2 to 103 spontaneous
traditions, norms, religion 
Institutional environment: 
formal rules of the Get the institutional  
game—especially 10 to 10
2 environment right. First 
property (judicial, order economizing.  
bureaucracy)
Governance: play of the 
game—especially contract Get the governance  
(aligning governance 1 to 10 right. Second order 
structures with economizing.
transactions) 
Resource allocation and Get the marginal
employment (prices and continuous  conditions right. Third 
quantities, incentive order economizing.  
alignment)
L1: social theory 
L2: economics of property rights/positive political theory 
L3: transaction cost economics 
L4: neoclassical economics/agency theory
Under this schematic, changes like the Glorious Revolution were key events 
that could change all levels of institutional historical inquiry. But the purpose of
institutional history for these economists was what Williamson calls here first, 
second, and third order economizing—that is, understanding how rules in long
gestation and rare disruptive events change the rules that shape human 
behavior.26 
25. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J.
ECON. LIT. 595, 597 (2000). 
26. Id. at 597–98. 
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A generation later, new institutional economics was only gaining steam as a 
matter of economic theory and empiricism. The most important academic of the 
second generation of new institutional economics was, arguably, Avner Greif,
especially his Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from the 
Medieval Trade.27 Greif viewed “institutions-as-rules” as “very useful in 
examining . . . the rules that politicians prefer and the contractual forms that 
minimize transaction costs.”28 But he also saw in this view of institutions a key
flaw: people do not always follow rules, and knowing on the basis of rules alone 
why some people follow and others ignore does not tell us much.29 To overcome
this flaw, Greif moved institutional economics past “rules of the game” and
toward a theoretically-informed behaviorist approach that viewed institutions as
game theoretic equilibria or, if not exactly equilibria, the “shared beliefs 
motivating equilibrium play.”30 This move allowed Greif to bring the methods of 
game theory to the study of institutions, but also pointed toward the need to relax 
the focus on formality in these rules and look instead at patterns of behavior 
rather than rules per se.31 Constitutions might matter in some cases, but informal
relationships among strangers can matter even more. Thus, Greif showed why
informal institutions can function so effectively in ensuring compliance, even in 
the absence of state enforcement. 
A final tradition in the new institutional economics has operationalized some
of the movement’s insights to make powerful arguments about nation-states, 
political systems, causation, and more. The most important work in this tradition
is Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, building on work they had done with
Simon Johnson.32 In that work, they seek to test the theories of new institutional 
27. See generally GREIF, supra note 15. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to adequately summarize
this ambitious book. At the highest level, this book is probably the most methodologically ambitious 
work of institutional history on either side of the economics and history divide. In it, Greif outlines a 
theory of institutions and institutional change that draws on formal game theory to work through why 
strategic agents structure formal and informal trade relationships. But it is also a sophisticated piece of 
history based on the analysis of primary documents—essentially unheard of in institutional economics. 
28. Id. at 8. 
29. Id. at 8–9. 
30. Id. at 10. 
31. Although the debt goes unacknowledged, Greif owes something to Samuel Huntington’s idea
of institutions as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior.” SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL
ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 12 (1968). 
32. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 546, 572 (2005) (“Our 
hypothesis is that Atlantic trade generated large profits for commercial interests in favor of institutional 
change in countries that met two crucial preconditions: easy access to the Atlantic and nonabsolutist 
initial institutions.”); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: 
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q.J. ECON. 
1231, 1279 (2002) (“The age of industry . . . created a considerable advantage for societies with institutions
of private property.”); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1395 (2001)
(considering “the impact of institutions on economic performance”). See also  DARON ACEMOGLU &
JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 1
(2012) (discussing the “huge differences in incomes and standards of living that separate the rich 
countries of the world . . . from the poor”). 
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economics on institutions—meaning, in North’s famous term, those “humanly 
devised constraints”33—that “influence the structure of economic incentives in
society.”34 The authors want to provide “comparative static results which will 
allow us to explain why equilibrium economic institutions differ.”35 From that 
starting point, the authors and their successors can better understand which 
institutions are best suited for the viability of society, states, political systems, and 
more. Once again, though, they are squarely in the tradition of institutions in the 
Northian sense. 
2. The Limits of New Institutional Economics in Institutional History
Greif and North show that new institutional economics is far from a 
homogenous field. And new institutional economists’ approach to institutional 
history is a valuable one that will likely long continue to yield important insights.
But there are three ways that new institutional economics is an insufficient lens 
to help understand an institution like the U.S. Federal Reserve System. First, it 
is insufficient at the definitional level. The attempted clarity at differentiating
organizations from institutions—and especially institutionalization of
organizations as a historical process—in the new institutional economics 
literature takes for granted the very boundaries of organizations—what divides
one organization from another. To take a question that will occupy some 
attention in the pages ahead: is the Federal Reserve public or private? Do its 
activities reflect an exercise of governmental power or market power? If that 
balance changes over time, has the institution changed? The point is, the Fed has 
had the same name for 100 years: the U.S. Federal Reserve System. 
Organizationally, there have been a few changes, including some that will I 
discuss. But institutionally—from the perspective of what, exactly, are the rules, 
norms, and social patterns of central banking—the Fed in 2020, or even 1950, 
bears little relationship to the institution legislatively-created in 1913.
Although scholars in the new institutional economic tradition are keenly
attuned to questions of human behavior, humans in their model are agents who
seek to magnify influence through organization and change institutions to 
maximize, or optimize, their various goals according to simple utility calculations. 
In this approach, organizations function within institutional frameworks, seeking 
to influence those frameworks but still subject to them all the same. The new 
institutional synthesis looks beyond this narrower field and wants to know not 
about the rules at the broadest level of society, politics, or economy, but the
narrow rules that define those organizations themselves. Institutions are rules,
organizations, and networks. 
33. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 19 (1991). 
34. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Institutions as a Fundamental Cause 
of Long-Run Growth, in 1 A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 386, 389 (Philippe Aghion & Steven 
N. Durlauf eds., 2005). 
35. Id.
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Second, the new institutional economics approach, as articulated by 
Williamson and endorsed by many others, is too certain of the time along which
institutions are created and change than evidence can support. Consider again
Williamson’s schematic, from Figure 1. The new institutional synthetic approach
to these same questions would not feel settled with the assumption that 
institutional change happens over a slow drip over the course of millennia. 
Instead, the historical question would be to drill deeply into these periods of 
acute change, recognizing that these periods of acute change can happen far more
often than at the level of regime change. The Glorious Revolution surely matters, 
as North and Weingast note.36 So too does the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. But 
so do scores of other changes that slowly, but acutely, influence the shape of the 
space within which individuals and organizations operate to accomplish their 
goals, from the Fed’s legislative redesign in 1935,37 to the informality of the 
Treasury-Fed dispute and the mythology that became the Fed-Treasury 
Accord.38 Big Bang institutional changes matter, but so too do the smaller 
changes that can, sometimes only through historical revisionism, change 
institutional trajectories. 
Finally, new institutional economics’ conceptions of institutions rely too
heavily on the idea that rules, relationships, and organizations are planned
strategies, where agents seek to change the rules of play in order to accomplish 
some specific goals. Even if this is an accurate description in some cases, it is not 
always true. If institutions are “humanly devised constraints,” as North argues, 
the importance of contingency in setting the organizational and institutional stage 
is lost in an apparatus too wedded to game theory and utility maximization.39 In
the pages ahead, we will see some exquisite planning by historical actors. We will 
also see in fuller display the whims of historical caprice. Had this Roosevelt Brain 
Truster not attended that banking convention, had this Secretary of the Treasury 
not had gout, and had that Fed Chairman not offended this member of Congress:
well, then, the institutions of central banking in the twentieth-century United
States would look very different. The idea that almost complete, “totalized
contingency,” as Christopher Tomlins has put it, is central to the historical
process is not a new one.40 But it is not a part of the new institutional economics,
and the lack of attention to such randomness at the institutional level is a 
weakness. New institutional economics cannot, by itself, function as the 
36. See North & Weingast, supra note 19, at 804 (discussing the “fundamental institutions of 
representative government emerging out of the Glorious Revolution”). 
37. See  PETER CONTI-BROWN, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 28–32
(2016) (describing the restructuring of the Federal Reserve under The Banking Act of 1935). 
38. Id.; see also JAMES MAHONEY & KATHLEEN THELEN, EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER 1 (2009) (observing that “institutions often change in subtle and
gradual ways over time. Although less dramatic than abrupt and wholesale transformations, these slow
and piecemeal changes can be equally consequential for patterning human behavior and for shaping
substantive political outcomes”). 
39. NORTH, supra note 33. 
40. Christopher Tomlins, What is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique? Revisiting
Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories”, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 155, 164 (2012). 
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theoretical backdrop for understanding institutional change at the Federal
Reserve, nor can it adequately provide the theoretical bottom for institutional 
history as a subdiscipline. 
B. Organizational Synthesis in History 
1. Institutions in the Organizational Synthesis 
If new institutional economics is not the theory for thinking through
institutional change at the Fed, then perhaps the “organizational synthesis,” 
another primary institutional frame for thinking about institutions, is. In three 
essays spanned over thirty-five years, Galambos proposed the organizational
synthesis as a lens that could account for the rise and development of the U.S.
state across public, private, and nonprofit sectors.41 Galambos’ “institutional” 
view of history emphasized a certain kind of agnosticism: economic and political
development did not march nobly and teleologically toward greater efficiency 
(contra to some of the new institutional economists), or equity (contra to some
of the Progressive historians), nor even necessarily toward the stability or
equilibria favored by later new institutional economics scholars. But neither did 
development degenerate into an exploitative and malevolent distribution of 
goods, governmental services, and political participation. Sometimes institutional 
change just was. 
As Galambos described it in the first essay, institutional and organizational 
history “abandon[s] the heroes and villains of the progressive synthesis and the 
New Left” in favor of a dispassionate, almost clinical exploration of social, 
political, and economic structures.42 Indeed, under Galambos’s formulation, 
there would be no heroes or villains at all largely because there would be so few 
individuals: “Organizational history will . . . stress the role of environmental 
forces acting on the individual. Less emphasis will be placed on the individual’s 
efforts to shape his own historical context.”43 Although Galambos referenced
new institutional economics only in a passing footnote in his third essay, this 
individual-less conception of history’s march would be comfortable within that
tradition.44 Indeed, Galambos saw the organizational synthesis as sitting 
comfortably at the intersection of social science and history.45 
As with the new institutional economics, the organizational synthesis came at 
a disorienting time in U.S. historiography. The liberal presidential synthesis was 
41. See sources cited supra note 3. 
42. Emerging Organizational Synthesis, supra note 3, at 289. 
43. Id. at 288. 
44. Recasting the Organizational Synthesis, supra note 3, at 11 n.31. 
45. See Emerging Organizational Synthesis, supra note 3, at 290 (“The chief strength of the 
organizational approach is a mode of analysis which blends the traditional tools of historical thought with 
ideas from the behavioral sciences.”). In important ways, Galambos was following Hofstadter’s lead from 
twenty years before. See  RICHARD HOFSTADTER & C. DEWITT HARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
SCOPE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 239 (1952) (“The university cannot create such
a faculty any more than any other social institution. What it can do is provide the most favorable 
circumstances for such ability to achieve full stature and develop its full meaning.”). 
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collapsing as New Left historians found so much to despise in the presidential 
politics of Vietnam. The presidential synthesis had been an attractive lens for 
viewing U.S. history. Franklin Roosevelt—and, in a different way, his relative 
Theodore—had placed power and agenda-setting in the White House in a way 
that historians accepted, even celebrated. Some of these historians gave personal 
witness to the power of the Presidency: for example, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote 
to celebrate “The Age of Roosevelt” even as he advised the Kennedys.46 
The presidential synthesis failed for intellectual and methodological reasons. 
Intellectually, it was not defensible to periodize U.S. history in stubs of four- and 
eight-year administrations. No serious question in U.S. history starts and begins
in perfect sync with the presidential electoral cycle. More importantly, presidents 
cannot set the agenda and drive history as well as many historians assumed they 
could. Indeed, Roosevelt may have been the exceptional president with social 
and political values to celebrate by academic historians. 
Methodologically, the 1970s saw the trickles that would become a roaring 
stream in social and cultural history that continues to dominate the academic 
history today. Social and cultural historians of race, gender, sexuality, and even
politics moved beyond the presidential focus by rejecting the notion that we can 
understand the past when limited to the doings and sayings of white elites.47 This 
social and cultural revolution in history meant that a president-focused history
had little-to-no place in the historiography of the age. The new approach was 
“fractured,” in Daniel Rodgers’s term.48 The age of presidents was over. 
The institutional and organizational histories surveyed, and anticipated, by
Galambos came at the beginning of these junctures. His movement past heroes, 
villains, and even individuals, was an effort to take institutional history in the 
opposite direction of history’s mainstream. “The rendezvous of modern history,”
he wrote, “still appears to be with bureaucracy in the private, public, and 
nonprofit sectors.”49 Rather than embracing the move toward social and cultural 
history, Galambos and others were striving to understand the bigger picture of 
corporations, Congress, and bureaucracies: in their words, institutions and 
organizations.50 This was the methodological and substantive approach
Galambos and his successors sought to synthesize.
46. See generally 1 ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER: 1919–1933, THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1957); 2 ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL: 1933– 
1935, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1958); 1 ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL:
1935–1936, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1960). 
47. For an overview of the social historical revolution, see Raphael Samuel, What is Social History?, 
HISTORY TODAY (Mar. 3, 1985) (“[Social History] prides itself on being concerned with “real life” rather
than abstractions, with “ordinary” people rather than privileged elites, with everyday things rather than
sensational events.”). 
48. See Daniel Rodgers, Age of Fracture, 12 HISTORICALLY SPEAKING 12, 13 (2011) (“In all these
ways and more, the realm of the social fractured. Mental images of society became more fragmented and 
gated, broke into individualized pieces, and lost dimensions of power.”). 
49. Recasting the Organizational Synthesis, supra note 3, at 4. 
50. Id. at 36 (“In American society today power continues to be wielded primarily by 
bureaucracies.”).
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2. Alternatives to the Organizational Synthesis 
There are two veins in history that arose as institutional and organizational 
alternatives to both top-down presidential and bottom-up social approaches to 
political and economic history. The veins rose in tandem but with no clear 
intellectual debt to Galambos. First came the revolution in business history
instigated by Alfred Chandler, Jr. and his followers; historians who embodied the 
organizational synthesis better than any but with no obvious debt to the 
organizational reframing.51 Second, a group of historically-minded political
scientists working under the banner of “American Political Development,” 
including Stephen Skowronek52 and, more recently, Daniel Carpenter.53 
Chandler advanced the thesis that the defining factor in twentieth century 
economics was the use of managerial and communications technology to 
consolidate, through economies of scale and scope, the management of the 
economy not in the state, but in the firm.54 In this way, business history sat at the 
intersection of the history of technology and transaction-cost economics 
propounded by theorists like Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, which was 
distinct from but closely related to especially Williamson’s vision of institutions. 
Under Chandler’s retelling, the corporatist model of the New Deal and beyond 
was not the defining institutional innovation of the era: it was the managerial
revolution that oversaw mass production, global conglomerates, and the 
coordination of these activities actively, through management, rather than 
passively, through markets.55 The managerial revolution was squarely an 
organizational one. 
The second vein was American Political Development. Here, the influence
on political history from political science is more important than the influence on 
political science from history. The influence has been significant, and fits, too, 
within the institutional and organizational frame that Galambos described. 
Skowronek’s Building the American State is the most ambitious of these
institutional histories, because it focuses so completely on the construction of a
variety of institutions, from political parties, the civil service, the military, and 
51. See  ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 1–14 (1977) (providing a “history of a business institution,” and discussing how 
modern business institutions “took the place of market mechanisms”). 
52. See  STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 3–18 (1982) (describing “the new state and
American Political Development,” and the pervasiveness of institutional and organizational “coercive 
power” in American lives). 
53. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 1–13 (2001) 
(discussing the organizational transformation, and the “dynamics of bureaucratic autonomy in domestic
policy arenas”). 
54. See CHANDLER JR., supra note 51, at 1 (“[M]odern business enterprise took the place of market
mechanisms in coordinating the activities of the economy and allocating its resources.”). 
55. See id. at 484 (describing “the new economic function—that of administrative coordination and 
allocation—and the coming of a new subspecies of economic man—the salaried manager—to carry out 
this function”). 
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independent commissions.56 The main macro-organizational point he made is
that “states change (or fail to change) through political struggles rooted in and 
mediated by pre-established institutional arrangements.”57 The meaning of 
institutions is largely unspecified, but roughly consistent with the organizational 
view offered by Galambos. 
Carpenter, writing twenty and thirty years later, wrote more or less within the
organizational synthesis (although he would reject that claim: his one invocation
of the synthesis is to dismiss it as insufficiently theorized).58 Carpenter wanted to
describe not only the growth of organizations, but also the way that power within
them is exercised.59 For Carpenter, the focus was on bureaucratic autonomy, by 
which he meant the ability bureaucratic agencies have to “change the agendas 
and preferences of politicians and the organized public.”60 This kind of autonomy 
is the outgrowth of reputation and credibility cultivated among communities of
experts outside the political process. When that autonomy is cultivated, even
those politicians with the legal authority to supervise that authority—presidents 
or members of Congress, for example—cannot do so. The autonomous 
bureaucracy is simply too strong. Accordingly, an institutional history under
Carpenter’s vision fits within organizations—whether the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the postal system,61 or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).62 
3. Weaknesses to the Organizational Synthesis 
Galambos chose his label carefully: unlike new institutional economics, the 
organizational synthesis is not a carefully-organized school of thought but rather
an external imposition of an explanation for the modern development of public 
and private life in twentieth-century United States. As such, the organizational
synthesis has always been vulnerable to the critique that it is simultaneously both 
too broad and too narrow. By focusing on structures of society, and not on the 
people behind them, it excludes “vast segments of society to the periphery of 
historical analysis.”63 Too much history is missed when the conception of the 
56. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 52, at 15 (outlining the wide breadth of the book’s consideration, 
including “civil administration, army reorganization, and the establishment of national railroad
regulation”). 
57. Id. at ix. 
58. See CARPENTER, supra note 53, at 373 (failing to integrate organizational synthesis into author’s 
larger argument). 
59. See id. at 13 (suggesting the relative power and legitimacy of bureaucratic agencies accounts for
their autonomy). 
60. Id. at 15. 
61. See id. at 3–13 (outlining the forthcoming discussion of the Post Office Department and the 
United States Department of Agriculture). 
62. See id. at 366 (suggesting the Food and Drug Administration “accords more or less with the
theory presented”). 
63. Alan Brinkley, Writing the History of Contemporary America: Dilemmas and Challenges, 113
DAEDALUS 121, 134 (1984). 
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twentieth century includes only the faceless and massive organizations that arose 
during that century.64 
My critique of the organizational synthesis is related to those, but goes to a
more definitional level and is similar to the problem with new institutional 
economics as the foundation of institutional history. Organizations, structures,
bureaucracy, institutions—these terms become synonyms, leaving us with an 
account of history that only looks at marble buildings and the businessmen and 
politicians who built them. We gain something important from the organizational
approach to institutional history—a biographical sense of the big founding
moment and development of specific entities like the Federal Reserve, or 
General Motors, the FDA, a professional society, or a specific technology.
But the organizational approach does not tell us much about institutional
change. Institutional history cannot be reduced to organizational biography. By 
focusing institutional history on these proper nouns, we can abuse historical 
narratives by placing organizations at the center of histories that are about so 
much more. The new institutional synthesis is richer and much more defensible 
when it focuses on the near constant pressure—external and internal—to change, 
disappear, reinvent, and progress that characterizes so much of institutional 
development the world over. Such pressures are never confined to a single 
organizational entity and are unlikely to be understood if historians require them 
to be.
Failing to understand these pressures more comprehensively is similar to the 
critique that the organizational synthesis fails to account for so much of society. 
For example, no serious scholar would presume to tell the history of the New 
Deal by focusing exclusively on the legislative process that created the slew of 
administrative agencies, as important as those agencies may be. Rather, we have 
to understand how people at the core and the periphery sought to influence these 
ideas and structures. These individuals and structures came to points of
contention. Sometimes they created these changes, sometimes they reacted to 
them. Sometimes change occurred slowly, sometimes rapidly. And sometimes 
these changes were to create new organizations, sometimes new rules of the
game, sometimes new relationships. And often these changes redefined the 
boundaries that separated one kind of organization from another. 
This definitional departure matches colloquial usage. Think about both the 
institution of marriage and the Brookings Institution. Or that an individual 
person has reached such heights that she has become an institution, even as we 
each refer to our professional affiliations as institutions of higher education, by 
which we mean collections of buildings with proper names like Wharton or the
University of Pennsylvania.
64. For other critiques of the organizational synthesis, see Brian Balogh, Reorganizing the 
Organizational Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in Modern America, 5 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
119, 121–22 (1991). 
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C. Historical Institutionalism 
1. The Promise and Challenge of Historical Institutionalism 
The third and most promising vein for the historical understanding of 
institutions has been called “historical institutionalism.”65 Suddaby, Foster, and 
Mills, leading theorists of historical institutionalism, argue for four propositions 
that should motivate the historical study of institutions.66 First, the nature of the 
truth claims are “particularist and localized, rather than universal.”67 Second, 
“historical studies of institutions focus on complex, rather than unitary 
causality.”68 Third, the “motivations for historical studies of institutions tend to
be driven by empirical phenomena or puzzles rather than gaps in theory.”69 And 
finally, historical institutionalism is focused on “endogenous rather than
exogenous explanations for institutions.”70 
This new and growing trend to think through organizational theory from the 
methodological perspective of history is an important departure point for the new 
institutional synthesis described in this Article. Certainly, the attention to
complex causality—centrally related to the importance of contingency and 
historical “accidents” as drivers of historical change—is crucial to the study of 
institutional history. And thinking of “institutions” as a process whereby 
organizations develop some sort of social stickiness is important, too. It is the 
process of institutionalization—both in history and historicity—that should play 
a central role in the new institutional synthesis. 
But there are important differences, not least in the idea that history can be 
abused into providing more of an explanation for the present than can be
justified. In rising to the defense of history, some historical institutionalists 
commit the founders’ fallacy of privileging initial founding events over
subsequent ones. For example, Khurana argues that an appreciation for history
is an appreciation of founding moments: “[It] is essential to examine an
institution’s birth—its emergence out of an interaction with the larger society and
culture, the evolution of its internal dynamic and the interface between the 
two. . . . The key here is to show organizations responding to particular problems 
65. See Roy Suddaby, William M. Foster & Albert J. Mills, Historical Institutionalism, in
ORGANIZATIONS IN TIME 100, 111 (Marcelo Bucheli & Daniel Wadhwani eds., 2014). The authors offer 
the best articulation of historical institutionalism in the literature, and come closest to the new 
institutional synthesis I have in mind. For reasons discussed, however, there are still significant 
differences between their approach and mine. Historical institutionalism is also in many ways reactive to
“new institutionalism” in organization theory and sociology. See, e.g., John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan,
The Structure of Educational Organizations, in SCHOOLS AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO EDUCATION 217, 219 (Jeanne H. Ballantine & Joan Z. Spade eds., 3d ed. 2008) (arguing institutions
“are not necessarily rational in an economic sense, but are consistent with ‘rules, norms, and ideologies
of the wider society’”). 
66. See Suddaby, Foster & Mills, supra note 65, at 104–05 (outlining the four propositions that 
should motivate the study of institutions). 
67. Id. at 104. 
68. Id.
 69. Id. at 105. 
70. Id.
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posed by history.”71 Scholars in the new institutional synthesis are as interested
as historical institutionalists in the “evolution” of internal institutional dynamics 
as they interact with outside social and cultural pressures, but this articulation of 
history—in Khurana’s case, the history of the American business school as an 
institution—is question-begging. Did institutionalization occur at the founding 
moment? Did durability of specific institutional arrangements become 
institutional because of founders’ ambition for such? Or did the process of 
institutionalization come more gradually than that? 
D. The Various Laws and Economics Movements 
1. Law and Economics in Three Movements. 
I pluralize, however awkwardly, the descriptor for the law and economics 
movement because we have, so far, seen various waves of the law and economics 
movement. I want to focus on three: the traditional law and economics movement 
that arose in the early 1970s and still continues today, the empirical turn in law 
and economics, and the focus on incentives in business law scholarship. These are 
under and overlapping. There are many other ways to do law and economics,
including in behavioral and critical traditions, that are less relevant to this 
discussion.
The first law and economics movement, as discussed above, was a rifle shot 
throughout the legal academy and the bar, transforming field after field to the 
point where today’s discussions of, say, antitrust, corporate law, or bankruptcy,
occur with barely a head nod to alternative methodologies and epistemologies.
Why did law and economics succeed so spectacularly? The intellectual 
contributions are an important factor. Law and economics provided an analytical 
framework that settled thorny problems of law’s limits and possibilities. It also 
presented a common language to engage with these questions, providing a 
semblance of rigor to the conversations. This matters for becoming a research 
program and an ideological movement alike.
Law and economics was, of course, both. As Yair Listokin argues in this 
volume, the law and economics movement’s interactions with a political platform 
gave it a kind of legendary status whereby conferences and sabbaticals were 
easily funded and cohorts could form.72 Even in well-endowed institutions like 
the University of Chicago, Yale, Harvard, and Stanford, where these early paths 
were forged, money goes a very long way toward hegemony.
Eventually, though, the legal academy wanted more, and some time in the 
early 2000s—as economics itself took an empirical turn—law and economics 
became much more focused on methods, and much less on informal theory. The 
71. RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS 
PROFESSION 14–15 (2007). 
72. See generally Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 141. 
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empirical turn has had profound impacts on hiring selection and training 
incentives for rising stars in law and economics. Today, the law and economics 
movement is much more likely to include card-carrying members of the
economics profession, hired by and housed in law schools, who use empirical 
methods developed in their cognate disciplines to inform debates about law and 
its consequences. 
Finally, it is worth a brief discussion regarding the consuming obsessions of 
one significant branch of the law and economics movement: corporate
governance and especially the study of Delaware corporate law. Perhaps no field 
of study has dominated law and economics more. To an outsider, “corporate law” 
means simply business law, the alternative to “public law” studied by scholars 
who focus on the Constitution, courts, and the administrative state. The rise and
dominance of Delaware courts has been richly studied and needs no further 
elaboration here. But the second-order question—the rise and dominance of the
study of corporate governance, Delaware, and related issues—does. The rise of 
the corporate form is certainly a historical and legal phenomenon of great worth 
for scholars to explore and understand. The existence of this movement needs no
explanation. Its prominence, however, does. 
2. The Limits of Laws and Economics 
If institutions are the thesis—the affirmative starting point for analysis, 
according to this Article—then the first wave of law and economics is the
antithesis. Law and economics prides itself on refracting away the complexities 
of institutions. Incentives matter, and rational actors’ responses to incentives— 
for good or ill—is the appropriate topic of conversation. So it is that we recast 
bankruptcy as the creditor’s bargain, antitrust as protection of consumer welfare,
and corporate governance as the study of shareholders’ exercise of voting rights 
to enhance the value of their assets. Here, institutions, except in the narrowest 
sense—the rules that create the incentives—become largely an afterthought, if
they show up at all.
The empirical turn in law and economics is more promising, because it seeks 
to exploit knowledge about institutions—organizations and rules—to test the 
hypotheses that economic theory generates. This kind of knowledge base is 
important and can correct instincts of economists who assume facts about the 
world that do not exist,73 or lead them to err when they do undertake empirical 
analysis.74 But there is a risk here, too. Hiring preferences for those with 
demonstrable technical skills risks privileging those technical skills at the 
73. See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
1325, 1325–31 (2013) (describing the legal structure of corporate governance and the ways that non-
lawyers can misunderstand that structure). 
74. One of the most prominent examples is Holger Spamann’s article, The “Antidirector Rights
Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467, 483 (2009), which upends the legal data that supported bold
conclusions about shareholder protections in common law countries found in one of the most cited 
articles in economics, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
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exclusion of the kinds of institutional knowledge that gives legal scholars their 
purported research advantage. At the same time, those Ph.D. candidates with the 
most innovative methodological skills will, because of the incentives of their 
training, gravitate more toward their own disciplines. The downside risk of the
empirical turn in law and economics is that legal scholars are left with the worst 
of both worlds: methodologists who are far from the vanguard in developing their 
skills in ways that are valued by their home disciplines, and legal scholars with
minimal training or knowledge of institutions that would allow them to make
meaningful contributions in law. 
The focus on Delaware and corporate governance presents a different kind 
of risk. That long dominance within business law makes it harder for legal 
scholars to see the world as it has evolved. The financial crisis of 2008, for
example, found many corporate governance scholars grappling with the meaning 
of problems that have only passing relevance to corporate governance. The 
solution to this problem is a more ecumenical approach to defining the problems 
of business law, to erode the dominance of Delaware corporate governance as 
the main epistemology of our discipline. In that sense, we should want to see 
more study of the payment system, less of the poison pill; more study of central
banks, less of corporate boards; more study of banking as a subset of 
administrative law, less of banking as a subset of corporate governance.
III
THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL SYNTHESIS, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
The weaknesses identified above present some clear paths for improving the
study of institutions. For a viable research program to take root, though, we need 
something more muscularly theoretical. 
The new institutional synthesis can present that research program. By
developing methods and substance to look at institutions as both rules and 
organizations—or, perhaps better, as rules shaped by organizations—the new 
institutional synthesis presents a path for understanding ideas that have been
siloed by various scholars but should not have been. For example, administrative
law scholars, corporate law scholars, and scholars of central banking have each 
made “independence” a hallmark for study. But why? To what ends? And what 
can we learn about the institutional framework that surrounds each enterprise to 
get at insights more deeply rooted in social, economic, political, and legal 
traditions than any one of these alone?75 
The spirit of the new institutional synthesis is ecumenicism, so I am reluctant 
to put these ideas forward as the sole or even dominant epistemology of 
institutions. But it is worth pausing on that idea: perhaps legal scholars, 
economists, and historians are all describing different parts of the elephant in the 
dark. Perhaps institutions are the elephant itself. And perhaps the new 
75.  I take up this question in Peter Conti-Brown, Independence, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2020). 
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institutional synthesis, done with an eye toward both organizations and broader 
rules and social patterns, and the processes by which organizations become 
permanent, can bring together these disciplines that otherwise do not have much
to say to each other.
If that idea is correct—that institutions are the full elephant—then we need
to better understand what institutions are. And these leading definitions— 
institutions-as-rules, institutions-as-organizations, and institutions as the process 
by which organizations become permanent—are too narrow to capture the
phenomenon of institutions, and especially institutional change, generally. If
institutions are rules, organizations, and processes, we can use them to uncover
the ways that social, cultural, economic, and political forces express themselves 
through organizational nubs with porous boundaries that are themselves defined
by rules, formal and informal. “Institutions” are not simply broad themes like 
elections, governmental regimes, property rights, the enforceability of contract, 
or the independence of the judiciary, nor are they static organizations with proper
names like the Federal Reserve or the Food and Drug Administration or General
Motors. Instead, in the new institutional synthesis, institutions like the Federal 
Reserve are organizations whose boundaries are constantly changing through
human effort and historical contingency, wrapped around specific but changing
sets of problems.
To operationalize this argument, the new institutional synthesis proceeds on
five bases. Given my own interests, I will discuss each step in the context of the
institutional evolution of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. 
First, individuals matter. People with specific policy aims are at the heart of 
institutional formation and institutional evolution, even and especially when 
these individuals’ policy aims conflict. So it was with Salmon Chase creating a
national banking system to meet the demands of war finance,76 Paul Warburg
seeking to impose a more rational system on his adopted homeland,77 Marriner 
Eccles refusing to serve in the Roosevelt Administration until he could rewrite 
the Federal Reserve Act.78 People are everywhere in institutional history. This 
idea is in tension with both the organizational synthesis and new institutionalism 
that would focus on exogenous events, and with trends in social history that 
would deemphasize the role of policymakers in shaping the institutional context 
in which they operate.
Second, people act through organizations. These actors operate not in a
vacuum, but through formal collaborations, and existing and new organizations. 
In each example above and in the many others that follow, individuals organize. 
76. Salmon Chase, FED. RESERVE HISTORY, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/ 
salmon_chase [https://perma.cc/U3S3-DS3W]. 
77. Paul Warburg’s Crusade to Establish a Central Bank in the United States, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF MINNEAPOLIS, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/paul-warburgs-crusade-to-
establish-a-central-bank-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/45K3-P3U8]. 
78. MARRINER ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS 165–67 (1951). 
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They name themselves, they band together with likeminded others, they try to 
create something not only as the ultimate goal, but as the intermediate one.
Third, conflict defines institutionalization. These organized efforts are not 
unopposed. Sometimes institutional moments can occur because of a subtle 
change that is adopted without much fanfare—rendering the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York a permanent member of the Federal Open Market 
Committee in 1942 is a good example of this.79 But much more often, there is 
opposition. This opposition comes to define institutional moments, because it is
here that winners and losers declare victory and defeat new and old ways of doing 
things. 
Fourth, predicting founding moments is difficult. Not all such collisions will be 
obvious for the broader process of institutionalization, which makes predicting 
the importance of specific moments hard to do beforehand. Sometimes this is 
easy to do—the Fed’s legislative founding in 1913 is plainly one such moment.80 
But Congress’s quiet retirement of the Fed’s reauthorization provision did not 
command near the same attention as the identical action in 1836, and even the
legislative recreation in 1935 did not generate near the attention at the time.81 
And finally, institutionalization is both historical and historicized. By
historical, I mean that institutionalization takes place in history by the actors and 
organizations on the ground. By historicized, I mean that the power of 
institutionalization only comes later, sometimes by the same actors seeking to
revise the historical record in a way that favors them, other times by subsequent 
actors who had nothing to do with the institutionalized moment. 
The new institutional synthesis is guided by these principles. It varies from 
those adopted by the new institutional economists, organizational historians, and
historical institutionalists because it recognizes that organizations both influence
and are influenced by the rules that not only govern their conduct, but also give
them organizational meaning. It is focused on exogenous and endogenous 
phenomena. It recognizes that the process of institutionalization of norms and
organizations can move toward more and less institutional stickiness. And it
recognizes that the norms and traditions of institutional moments continue to be 
written long after the events described. 
To put it in terms of the Federal Reserve, compare the way that the three
groups might study central banks. An institutional economist might look at 
“central bank independence” as an amorphous label that they have come to
regard as the separation of monetary policy from electoral politics, arising in the 
79. 100 Years of Service (1914–2014), FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/
aboutthefed/centennial-timeline#event/24 [https://perma.cc/ZP99-NMEX]. 
80. Federal Reserve Act Signed by President Wilson, FED. RESERVE HISTORY, 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/salmon_chase [https://perma.cc/8ESL-U8P8].
 81. See Peter Conti-Brown, Central Banking and Institutional Change in the United States: 
Punctuated Equilibrium in the Development of Money, Finance, and Banking, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON CENTRAL BANKING 18–19 (Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa M. Lastra eds., 2018) (discussing the
legislative reconstruction of the Federal Reserve in 1935). 
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late seventeenth century and continuing to the present with a few twists and turns 
along the way.
An organizational historian would study the U.S. Federal Reserve System 
and seek to give the organization its biography. That historian would devote a lot 
of attention to the “founding” period, say, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, as 
the apotheosis of institution building in the United States. This kind of 
organizational history focuses on that Big Bang and then sees what mysteries can 
be discovered as the institution finds its way. Indeed, to take the Fed as an 
example, most of the historical effort will be in recovering the intellectual basis 
for that Big Bang. And historical institutionalists would also be anchored to 
founding moments and the internal dynamics of the organization thereafter. The
idea of deinstitutionalization—or the process whereby organizational ambitions 
to permanence, even if realized, do not succeed—is not part of that structure.
The new institutional synthesis adapts from all three approaches, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. To mix science metaphors, its focus is not on a Big Bang 
founding, but on a kind of punctuated equilibrium whereby institutional 
change—change as significant as the founding organizational moment—happens 
often but irregularly. The effort is to look at those bursts of institutional change
without losing sight of either the rules of the road and broad patterns and
equilibria, or of the ways that these individuals use organizational forms to 
accomplish these goals and change these rules.
Figure 2: Institutional Histories 
Some points worth emphasizing from this schematic. The new institutional 
synthesis is keyed toward the question of how the boundaries of organizations 
change over time. The theoretical commitments to this approach are three:
1. Rules and organizations are constantly changing.
2. Individuals—real people with stories, biographies, interests, failures,
successes—matter enormously. 
3. Contingency is everywhere. 
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A theory of institutional change that can predict the whole course of human 
history will not be found in the new institutional synthesis. A detailed, deep dive 
into specific changes in specific periods for specific organizations will. 
IV 
CONCLUSION
The Article has attempted to sketch how a new approach to the study of 
institutions differs from previous approaches in law, political science, sociology, 
and economics. In line with the best tradition of methodological essays, the
aspiration for this Article is to spur discussion forward rather than defend too
fiercely a movement already past. In that sense, the new institutional synthesis is 
not really a school of thought as much as an invitation to think about institutional 
history in a new way. Rather than focusing on institutions as organizations, this 
new institutional synthesis has shown how organizations change through the 
definition and redefinition of rules and norms: organizations are rules. 
The new institutional synthesis is also unusually agnostic regarding the 
normative claims about various trends in the historiography of state 
development. A proponent of the institutional approach I describe need not have 
any particular opinion about, say, the rise of the state in the nineteenth century 
or the way the New Deal changed the structure of government or whether our 
appropriate focus is on powerful elites or marginalized populations. Instead, the 
new institutional synthesis points to the need to delve deeply into the ways that
organizational boundaries shift over time. Uncovering those institutional 
historical narratives yields important insights relevant to these other debates, to 
be sure. But the new institutional synthesis carries a promise of methodological 
and ideological ecumenicism that other approaches do not offer. For that reason 
alone, perhaps, there is very good reason to look forward to the new institutional 
synthesis’s continued and accelerated growth in the years ahead.
